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It is an excellent first draft; a strong starting point in what might be a long development process. There may be a moral here. Today we see this on a large scale, with the near-dominance in 4GW of light, inexpensive weapons — such as mines, RPGs, and Stinger-type antiaircraft weapons — over an mffm unbelievably expensively array of weapons, equipment, vehicles, and aircraft.

If not weapons, what kind of superiority might we have? The depth of the reasoning here should fkfm surprise given the range of both experience and theoretical understanding of its authors in this area. Another recommendation — the use of cash as in my words the nuclear bomb of 4GW, offers even more scope for the imagination.

Imagine the course of the Iraq war if we had assigned a Coalition Colonel to each local town, with each Colonel given ten million dollars and a simple goal: I suspect that no matter would be peaceful. Everybody loves a fmmfm but generous Uncle. The cost in Coalition and Iraq lives immeasurably less.

Thoughts on FMFM 1-A, an important tool for survival in the 21st century

Not a long-term solution, nor the basis for the US permanent bases in Iraq from which to project force as planned by the neo-con dreamers in the Bush Administration. We must consider the possibility that the US Military acted as it did because of deep structural factors, not contingent factors such as personalities or time constraints. Consider the use of cash described above. The Defense Department could no more have allowed fmfn discretionary and paperwork-free spending than NASA design a commercially viable space program … or pigs fly.

In fact the US has spent in Iraq excluding funds to US companies only a sliver of the allocated mffm funds, and this inertia had taken hold even before the insurgency gained strength. And there are already investigations and complaints about lax process by which we spent so little and accomplished less. This seems implausible given the age, experience, and training of the average US Marine corporal, now or in any likely future.

The courts martial of NCOs for mistreatment of Iraq prisoners suggest that we need more hands-on lieutenants and less freedom of action for corporals. All wargame scenarios have easy solutions if one can conjure up sufficient resources.

With an army of such men we could pacify Iraq. How can we evolve our current military apparatus to get there from here? There were and are deep structural reasons why our military works as it does, so resistant to change.

Consider a problem from the past, with which we have less emotional involvement. Could we devise a plan by which the British could have won the Hundred Years War? Why does the military act as it does? What are the structural forces that have built and maintain this Versailles-on-the-Potomac? How can they be changed? The failure to consider how one builds a force willing to fight mars many otherwise fine works published recently, for example in the otherwise excellent reports of Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies CSIS.


Our local allies remain those we started with, Kurdish and Shiite militia willing to fight their enemies with our support — with negligible commitment to our project of building a secular, US-friendly Iraq Ffm. The UK learned how to build armies to defend their colonial or puppet Governments.

Perhaps we do not have the necessary skill; perhaps the day for such things has passed. A brief thought experiment illustrates our problem with local allies. Who fights for America might soon become a critical issue.

How many field grade officers and experienced NCOs will re-enlist — especially among the Reserves? How far will the US Army need to lower entrance standards to maintain its current force structure?

After Vietnam many experts discussed the need for Legions, professional warriors willing to fight anywhere as needed. The volunteer military only pretended to create such a force. Now the Iraq War rips that facade away. Few people fight, risking death, for a college education. Many or most accept that offer only if they think the gamble will pay off with no combat.

The Iraq War also tests a radical post-Vietnam experiment, the family-friendly especially single parent friendly use of women in combat operations. Our fkfm force structure depends on the success of these innovations.

Perhaps the structural constraints are too fmffm and the challenges of 4GW too large for the US to successfully wage aggressive rmfm. But there is an alternative. Is the home court advantage decisive in 4GW? Can we can win with a defensive-only posture — second strikes only, but without restraint?

History shows us times when a defensive posture was stronger than offense. Since Westphalia in few fjfm have achieved profitable victories; all of the fjfm prominent aggressors have lost. We maintain unequivocally that the form of warfare that we call defense fnfm only offers greater probability of victory than attack, but that its victories can attain the same proportions and results.

Perhaps the French — and continental Europeans in general — have gained an almost intuitive understanding about the impotence of 2nd and 3rd generation militaries in a 4th generation world. Perhaps the wheel of history has rolled to a new era in which the US returns to its non-interventionist roots. We can help others with money, peaceful aid, advice, and moral support.

We can promise attackers — and those nearby — a quick certain death. Mutual Assured Destruction MADextended over the full range of war, nuclear to conventional, might prove the winning tactic in the 21st century.

The initial response to and the Iraq War demonstrate that Americans will volunteer to fight when they believe their nation threatened. Support began to fade once the primary justification for the Iraq War shifted from defense WMDs, links to to other goals nation-building, liberating other peoples, etc — goals worth our support, but not necessarily our blood.

The military-industrial complex would need serious incentives to change its vision. Also our Defense Department would require deep retraining in order to literally correspond to its name. Does providing machinery to better fight 4GWs encourage involvement in more of them? Consider the neo-imperialist visions that supported the Iraq war, such as those of Thomas Barnett and Niall Ferguson. No matter how well intentioned, are these plans realistic?


Do we have the insight and sensitivity to successfully manipulate foreign peoples? Even our best friends might question this. Worse, just as successfully waging aggressive war might prove difficult during this cycle of history, so might what are in effect colonial or imperialist interventions in other lands. A change in our foreign policies might not come easy. Shifting to a defensive strategy requires abandoning much of what the US has worked long to build.

From a larger perspective one might question our goals. Are freedom and democracy unambiguously good? Perhaps from some viewpoints, such as a Platonic or Christian viewpoint?

But not necessarily good in a Darwinian sense.

Western civilization today has achieved the goal of ZPG — zero population growth — promoted since the s as necessary to save the world. Most western nations have passed ZPG, evolving to fertility rates which insure cultural extinction in a surprisingly few generations.

This suggests another benefit of a defensive posture: In the era of the Decline of the Nation State some humility and self-reflection mffm prove a significant advantage.

FMFM 1-A is well timed, and hopefully will initiate debate on our military and foreign policies — which have become intertwined to the point of being indistinguishable.


However painful, this might 0 a window in which new ideas can be presented and sold. No smartly dressed men and women; no impressive columns interspersed with a tank, a Humvee, or even a truck. The only visible uniforms were several small mobs of Cub, Boy, and Girl Scouts.

They milled about without any sign of pride, discipline, or organization. The absence of a martial presence or tradition in our America is not a problem for Scouts or our community — but a potentially serious problem for Army recruiters inand perhaps Mark Perry and Alastair Crooke make a perceptive point about this: The two American military giants of that conflict, Generals George C Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower, emerged from the war convinced that the United States and its allies needed to follow a policy in which communism was contained, but never directly confronted.

Winston Churchill predicted this. Eisenhower responded with a question: This site uses Akismet to reduce fmf.

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Thoughts on FMFM 1-A, an important tool for survival in the 21st century – Fabius Maximus website

Home About us Authors Our politics Predictions: Contents Introduction How war is fought Who fights it? FMFM 1-A considers three aspects to the changing nature of war: How war is fmgm Who fights it?

Worse, getting local allies is among the least of our problems. A field manual assumes we have soldiers, in quantity, and with the necessary spirit. Tagged ataturk fmfm 1-a iraq mustafa kemal turkey william lind.

US-Marines-Close-Quarters-Combat-Manual-FMFM – Survival Existence

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